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ADHESIVE ARBITRATION: THE SUSTAINING GRACE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD’S 





I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The four major American sports leagues, the National Football League (“NFL”), 
the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), Major League Baseball (“MLB”) and the 
National Hockey League (“NHL”), generated an estimated twenty-five billion U.S. 
dollars in revenues for 2012.
1
 The NFL ranks as the highest revenue-generating 
professional athletics league in the world, with the MLB coming in second, the NBA 
coming in fourth, and the NHL coming in as the sixth highest revenue-generating 
athletics league.
2
 While these leagues generate such a high amount of revenue, all 
stoppages of work go against the conventional business plan and prevent the generation 
of income. These high revenue-generating leagues have recently experienced more 
“lockouts” than in the past, as the owners and players associations argue vehemently over 
their share of the revenues.  
 Athletes and referees are generally considered the weaker negotiating party based 
on the high number of individual needs the player’s and referee’s associations must 
accommodate during negotiations. However, athletes and referees can be in a stronger 
position to bargain than employees in other venues, especially given their extremely 
unique and highly developed skills.
3
 To avoid a continuous cycle of being the weaker 
bargaining party and being locked out by the owners, the athletes and referees in the four 
major American sports leagues (“the leagues”) should demand a mandatory arbitration 
clause be included in their collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”). Ideally, this 
clause will call for binding arbitration by a neutral arbitrator if the players and referees 
cannot come to an agreement with the owners before the end of the prior contract terms. 
If the prior contract expires with no new contract between the players/referees and the 
owners, then each would propose the terms of their ideal contract to the arbitrators, and 
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the arbitrators will create terms of a new CBA to try and accommodate both parties. This 
proposition will prevent future inequitable agreements and ultimately avoid future 
lockouts. The Supreme Court has continued to support adhesive arbitration, and the 
recent decision in A T & T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion
4
 (“Concepcion”) has again 
upheld adhesive arbitration agreements, evidencing that in today’s world most consumer 
contracts are adhesive, and the courts have no issue enforcing them.
5
 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy
6
 held that labor agreements can include 
adhesive arbitration clauses, forcing employees to either agree to the employment 
contract, including any arbitration agreements, or be without employment.
7
 
 With the addition of a mandatory arbitration agreement in each of the four major 
sports’ CBAs, the leagues will continue to operate smoothly and, ideally, the terms of the 
CBAs will become a happy medium for the demands of both parties. With the 
enforcement of mandatory arbitration, negotiations will either become more efficient and 
effective, or the leagues will risk placing the CBA’s terms in the hands of an arbitral 
committee. Having the athletes impose a mandatory arbitration provision in the next 
revision of each leagues’ CBA will be a wise implementation by a traditionally weaker 
party, which is the opposite of the current trend in adhesive arbitration.  
 This article will first provide background information regarding the leagues and 
their recent history with lockouts and work stoppages. Next, this article will demonstrate 
the difference between American and European labor and consumer arbitration, as an 
example of a current approach to protecting traditionally weaker parties. This explanation 
will then be applied to show why the leagues’ athletes are the weaker party in CBA 
negotiations, but how the athletes can protect themselves in future CBA negotiations. 
Finally, this article will suggest how the addition of mandatory arbitration at the 
termination of a CBA’s terms will improve the efficiency and fairness of the leagues. 
II. THE INCREASING REOCCURRENCE OF LOCKOUTS IN THE FOUR AMERICAN 
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES 
A. The NFL’s Back-to-Back Lockouts 
In the past two years, the NFL has experienced two separate lockouts with their 
employees. The NFL’s current and prior CBAs do not have mandatory arbitration 
agreements that force arbitration once a CBA is about to expire. In 2011, the NFL 
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experienced a lockout with their players, which lasted nearly four and a half months and 
required the cancellation of the yearly “Hall of Fame” game.
8
 The second lockout, which 
took place in 2012, involved the NFL’s referees and generated a large amount of 
criticism based on the NFL’s response.
9
 
The players’ lockout involved key concerns by both the owners and the players. 
While the owners were interested in reducing the players’ share of the overall revenue, 
the players were concerned with the number and type of practices, the amount of physical 
contact allowed during practices, their health/injury protection, and retirement benefits 
available to the players.
10
 These concerns, all valid, would have affected not only the 
current state of the league, but would have also had a profound long-term effect because 
of the ten year length of the contract. The owners were able to negotiate with both current 
and future interests in mind, but the players had to focus more on the most favorable 
terms they could require for this CBA. With such high stakes, the best solution is to 
remove the negotiation process from the interested parties’ hands and allow a neutral 
arbitrator to draft a new CBA which will impose fair terms.  
In 2012, the NFL’s lockout with the referees lasted from June 2012 to July 2012, 
but only affected three weeks worth of games.
11
 The major issues that surrounded this 
lockout included the league’s desire to make the referees full-time employees while 
simultaneously lowering their salaries and pension plans.
12
 After the failure to reach an 
agreement, the NFL decided to hire replacement referees and hoped for a catalyst for 
future negotiations between the parties.
13
 The lockout with the referees was one that 
showed a rare weakness for the league, as a series of chaotic events took place in the 
three week absence of the officials and led to mounting criticism and questions 
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 See Brad Biggs and Vaughn McClure, Hall of Fame Game Canceled as Players Mull Deal, CHICAGO 
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lockout-after-reaching-new-labor-deal/57846906/1; see also David Vinjamuri, The Referee Lockout Is 
Hurting The NFL Brand, FORBES (Sept. 25 2012, 4:47 PM), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/site.davidvinjamuri/2012/09/25/the-referee-lockout-is-hurting-the-nfl-brand/. 
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 Due to the increasing amount of pressure, the NFL quickly came 
to an agreement to bring the original officials back to work. Had an arbitration clause 
been included in the referees’ prior CBA, the replacement referees may never have been 
needed, and the integrity of the league could have avoided criticism. 
B. The NBA’s Recent Experiences with Lockouts 
Dating back to 1995, the NBA has had four lockouts, with the most recent taking 
place at the beginning of the 2011-2012 season. Like the other leagues, the NBA has 
never had a mandatory arbitration clause in any CBA to force arbitration upon the 
expiration of the previous CBA. The first lockout, in 1995, lasted only three months, and 
the situation was unique because the lockout took place between the players and the 
players union, not the owners.
15
 The lockout occurred outside the regular season and did 
not cause any games to be missed.  
The NBA was unable to go one year without another lockout, because in 1996 the 
players were locked out for mere hours, making it the shortest lockout in professional 
athletics history.
16
 The lockout’s only issue was revenue sharing, as the league wanted to 
split evenly a fifty million U.S. dollar television contract to allow for higher player 




 The NBA’s first major lockout occurred before the 1998-1999 season. This 
lockout led to the cancellation of 464 games over 191 days.
18
 The major points of 
contention between the National Basketball Players Association (“NBPA”) and the 
owners were a proposed limit on players’ salaries and a strict rookie pay scale to limit 
salaries.
19
 Overall, the agreement between the two sides was viewed as a huge victory for 
the owners, while the players only received minor benefits.
20
 One of the most important 
consequences from the 1998-1999 lockout was the public display of internal divide and 
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suffering the players experienced as the lockout continued.
21
 The players were unable to 
continue as a unified front against the owners throughout the lockout, considering some 
players became desperate to settle and no longer could hold out for a better deal.
22
 
 The NBA’s most recent lockout, prior to the 2011-2012 season, spanned over 161 
days and cancelled 480 games. One of the lockout’s main issues was the league’s revenue 
sharing, with both sides wanting more access to a higher percentage of the revenue 
generated by the league.
23
 Ultimately, the new CBA allowed the players to receive only 
forty nine percent of the revenue generated, which was down from the fifty seven percent 
that the players received under the prior CBA.
24
 As protection from the current trend of 
rights being removed from the players, a mandatory arbitration clause at the expiration of 
the prior CBA will help create more fair terms between the owners and the athletes. 
C.  The MLB’s Minimal Experience with Lockouts 
The MLB has experienced fewer lockouts, even though the MLB has experienced 
more work stoppages because of player walk-outs. The MLB has been more successful 
than other leagues in timely negotiating a CBA agreement so their players remain on the 
field, and involve their players in the negotiation process to give them proper knowledge 
of what they are negotiating for.
25
 The 1994-1995 MLB strike was considered one of the 
world’s worst sports outages, when the players walked out in the middle of the season 
and the strike affected two seasons.
26
 While this was not a lockout by the owners, it had 
the same effect since players refused to work based on the belief the owners were acting 
in a collusive manner behind their backs, keeping millions of dollars out of the players’ 
hands.
27
 The strike led to the cancellation of the 1994 playoffs and World Series, and 
shortened the 1995 season - a total of 950 games were not played.
28
 Bad blood between 
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available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704335904574497433535880354; see 





the players and the owners was the primary cause of the strike, when it was discovered 
that the owners colluded to intentionally keep down the value of salaries. This problem 
was eventually corrected by mandatory salary arbitration, which stemmed from 
grievances filed by the players.
29
 The major crux of the negotiations centered around the 
reduction of salaries, as the owners wanted to institute a hard salary cap and the players 
wanted their salaries to continue growing.
30
 A final agreement between the owners and 
the players took significant time, as the players came back to work for the 1995 season 
without a CBA. A mandatory arbitration clause in the MLB’s CBA will prevent unfair 
CBA negotiations, and would allow the terms of the CBA to be neutral and favorable to 
both parties, either through negotiations by the parties, or a decision by a neutral 
arbitrator. Because the MLB already has significant experience with arbitration, through 
their use of salary arbitration, the MLB would be well positioned to expand their 
arbitration proceedings to include the creation of future CBAs. 
D. The NHL’s Three Lockouts 
Since 1994 the NHL has experienced three separate lockouts, totaling a loss of 
2,208 games.
31
 By numbers alone, the NHL has missed the most games due to lockouts, a 
factor many critics claim is the reason the NHL is the least successful American major 
sports league.
32
 Despite the frustration caused by repeated lockouts, the NHL has recently 
witnessed an increase in attendance, membership, revenue, and television audiences.
33
 
The NHL’s current and prior CBAs do not have mandatory arbitration agreements similar 
to the one being proposed. 
The 1994-1995 NHL season experienced a player lockout because an agreement 
could not be reached in drafting a new CBA. The lockout extended for three months, one 
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 See Barra, supra note 28; see also The Baseball Zealot, supra note 28. 
30
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 See Jeff Z. Klein, Breaking Down N.H.L.’s Three Lockouts, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012, 6:00 
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http://espn.go.com/nhl/story/_/id/8817964/ (discussing the possible future harms of another lockout for the 
NHL, claiming the brand damage may make it difficult to repair the required relationships with the fans 
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33
 See Sara Bibel, Regular Season NHL Viewership on NBC Sports Network is Best on Cable in Nearly Two 
Decades, TV BY THE NUMBERS (Apr. 30, 2013), available at 
http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2013/04/30/regular-season-nhl-viewership-on-nbc-sports-network-is-
best-on-cable-in-nearly-two-decades/180420; see also Curtis Eichelberger, NHL Borrows From NFL As It 





week, and three days, forcing the league to cancel 468 games.
34
 The player lockout was 
predominantly based on the fact that the NHL Players Association (“NHLPA”) could not 
come to an agreement with the owners over several issues, including the implementation 
of a salary cap, the length of the season, and revenue sharing between the teams.
35
 
The second player lockout the NHL experienced occurred in the 2004-2005 
season and caused the whole season to be forfeited because the players and owners both 
failed to reach an agreement.
36
 The player-opposed salary cap became a major issue 




Following the 2004-2005 season cancellation, the NHL experienced another 
player lockout eight years later, at the beginning of the 2012-2013 season. The major 
points of contention concerned revenue sharing, limits on the players’ contractual rights, 
and a push by the NHLPA to abolish the salary cap.
38
 The players agreed to take a seven 
percent drop in the share of revenue in return for their request to eliminate the salary cap. 
Ultimately the players were not granted their request, but they were still forced to accept 
the seven percent drop in revenue sharing.
39
 Based on the large amount of criticism 
toward the NHL for their repeated lockouts, the implementation of mandatory arbitration 
at the expiration of the prior CBA could help ensure continuous play for the NHL. 
III. WHAT FAIL-SAFES ARE AVAILABLE TO THOSE INVOLVED IN ARBITRAL 
PROCEEDINGS? 
A. Consumer Transactions: American v. European 
The approach to arbitration in consumer transactions is significantly different in 
the United States compared to most European countries.
40
 The recent activity by the 
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 See Klein, supra note 31. 
35
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36
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39
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8:35 AM), available at http://www.sbation.com/nhl/2013/1/7/3733442/nhl-lockout-over-questions-
answers. 
40
 See Jean R. Sternlight, Is The U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory 
Consumers and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 831-50 





American courts, as seen in Concepcion, has been to allow for arbitration agreements 
between consumers and merchants, regardless of the levels of adhesion found in the 
arbitration clause.
41
 The Supreme Court in Concepcion was protective of arbitration and 
ensured that arbitration, in accordance with Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) §2, 
continued to be a viable and valid form of conflict resolution for merchants.
42
 The 
Supreme Court wanted to ensure that the procedural advantages, specifically speed and 
informality, were upheld with the enforcement of arbitration.
43
 Since Concepcion, the 
Supreme Court upheld adhesive arbitration clauses in American consumer contracts in 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors (“Italian Colors”). In Italian Colors the Supreme 
Court enforced an arbitration clause that denied class arbitration and forced individual 
consumers to pursue arbitration even if the costs significantly outweighed the possible 
recoveries.
44
 The Court was not concerned with the unlikelihood of arbitration 
proceedings ever taking place under these arbitration contracts, but was more interested 
in allowing the party in a stronger position of bargaining (the merchant), to enforce the 
arbitration clauses imposed on the weaker party (the consumer).
45
 The Supreme Court is 
clear in Italian Colors, regardless of the unlikelihood, difficulties, or impracticalities in 
bringing forward an arbitration clause, that the arbitration clause will be found valid and 
enforceable.
46
 American courts have continued to uphold the enforceability of adhesive 
arbitration clauses, even if arbitration is against the consumers’ will, or effectively 
negates the purpose of pursuing arbitration, as in Italian Colors. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has effectively taken away the right of States to 
create legislation that will protect consumers from adhesive mandatory arbitration by 
enforcing the FAA as the controlling law.
47
 In American consumer transactions, the 
Supreme Court has relegated consumers to a weaker position of bargaining by allowing 
merchants to impose adhesive arbitration clauses upon the consumer and delegate the 
terms of the arbitration contracts without any input from the consumers. The courts have 
realized that consumer contracts in the United States have predominantly become 
contracts of adhesion, yet the courts continue to allow the arbitration clauses to be 
enforced against the powerless consumer.
48
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 In comparison, the European court system refuses to allow arbitration clauses to 
be oppressive and be enforced against the will of the consumer.
49
 One of the most clear 
examples that European law will not enforce an adhesive arbitration agreement stems 
from a European Union directive entitled “Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.”
50
 The 
directive explicitly held that unfair terms imposed by merchants would not be enforced 
and were to be considered invalid.
51
 The directive explained that any contractual term not 
individually negotiated by the consumer was to be considered unfair if it caused a 
significant imbalance in the consumer’s rights.
52
 The European Union directive was 
adopted by multiple countries concerned with the judicial rights of their consumers, 
including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
53
 The European Union continued 
to take the stance that forcing a consumer to agree to arbitration prior to understanding 
the specific issues or disputes was unfair, because it forced consumers to arbitrate issues 
before the consumer knew of the facts of their disputes or their rights associated with 
those facts.
54
 The European Union has taken a strong stance that arbitration will not be 
enforced, and likely cannot even be contracted, without an understanding consent by the 
consumers, which likely can only be done after the dispute has risen.
55
 Because 
arbitration under the European Union’s practice can only be conducted voluntarily, the 
consumer has the power to ensure that any arbitration will not be done against their will 
because the consumer can agree to enter binding arbitration only after they have 
compiled all of the facts and understand the rights they are contracting away. Unlike the 
United States, which allows for pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, some European 
countries allow the consumers to ultimately veto all arbitral proceedings to protect the 
consumer’s right to seek proper remedy for their harm. 
B. Labor and Employment Transactions: American v. European 
The disparity between the United States and European approach to consumer 
protection are mirrored in the realm of labor and employment arbitration. American labor 
arbitration predominantly stems from three early cases, known as the Steelworkers 
Trilogy.
56
 Essentially, the Steelworkers Trilogy set up four major principles when dealing 
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 See Council Directive 93/13 art. 6, 1993 O.J. (l95) 29 (EU). 
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51
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with arbitration clauses in labor agreements.
57
 The court determined that arbitration 
clauses were a matter of contract; therefore the deal that was negotiated and agreed to 
would be upheld, regardless of unconscionability or fundamental unfairness.
58
 The court 
continued to recognize that arbitration in labor agreements would be analyzed by the 
courts to determine if the contract at issue was actually agreed to, but once an arbitration 
agreement was found to exist and was agreed to, the court would review none of the 
merits and would place strong favor on the arbitrator continuing with the arbitration 
process.
59
 The American stance on labor arbitration, illustrated by the Steelworkers 
Trilogy, particularly A T & T Technologies v. Communications Workers of America, has 
been to enforce all arbitration clauses as agreed to, even if the agreement was forced upon 
the employee and adhesive in nature. American employees have traditionally been 
viewed as the weaker party. As such, the employees either have the choice to sign a 
contract that includes a pre-issue arbitration clause or refuse to work.
60
 Ultimately, if an 
employee wants to be hired or retained, they are required to sign the employment contract 




In contrast to the American stance on labor arbitration, European countries take a 
similar approach to labor arbitration as they do for consumer arbitration.
62
 Generally, 
European courts will not enforce resolution of employment disputes through private 
adjudication if the employee does not want to go forward without the protections offered 
by the legal system.
63
 European Union Member States generally are reluctant to enforce 
mandatory arbitration for employment issues and would prefer to protect employees by 
engaging in other forms of non-binding alternative dispute resolution before enforcing 
arbitration.
64
 While individual employment disputes are generally guided away from 
mandatory arbitration, CBAs have been allowed to develop through arbitration, and 
sometimes have even been mandated to do so.
65
 Like European consumer arbitration 
agreements, the weaker party (i.e., employees) in labor agreements has the right to refuse 
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arbitration if they believe it will be a reduction or removal of their substantive rights.
66
 
European law includes a “fail safe” provision that allows the employee to either uphold 
the arbitration agreement or deny it and proceed to a judicial forum.
67
 This “fail safe” 
provision is afforded to employees in Europe, but is not available to American employees 
because the Supreme Court has continuously ruled in favor of employers, taking away 
American employees’ rights to a proper judicial remedy.
68
 
C. American Athletics 
American athletics naturally have disparity in bargaining power between the 
owners and the players.
69
 When a CBA has expired or is about to expire, the negotiation 
between the owners and the leagues’ players association centers around each side 
wanting more money, and the athletes wanting more rights than the previous deal 
afforded.
70
 Since the inception of players associations, the owners have failed to take 
them seriously and traditionally have been unwilling to completely fulfill their 
demands.
71
 In the NFL, some of the original bargaining processes demonstrate that the 
players began with a terrible bargaining position and were repeatedly ignored.
72
 For 
example, in 1958, the NFLPA made continuous threats to file an antitrust lawsuit to 
obtain certain concessions, including a benefit plan, medical and life insurance, and 
retirement benefits for retired players when they reached the age of 65, from the 
owners.
73
 Initial threats, however, were considered futile because of the merger  between 
the NFL and the American Football League (“AFL”), which created two separate players 
associations, and, on numerous occasions, the owners pitted one players association 
against the other.
74
 In 1968, the NFLPA brought a list of demands required to be fulfilled 
in exchange for player employment, but the owners refused to meet these demands 
because the owners knew the AFL Players Association would be willing to continue 
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playing under the original terms.
75
 The NFLPA refused to concede their demands and 
went on strike, only to later agree to less than satisfactory employment terms.
76
  
The NFL has given numerous examples of the inherently weak bargaining 
position of the athletes and referees. Particularly in 1971, following the hiring of a more 
aggressive NFLPA executive director, the NFLPA made specific demands, and when 
those demands were not met the players went on strike.
77
 The owners took absolutely no 
action, believing they could win their case in court. Only five weeks later, before the case 
could proceed to court, the NFLPA gave up on their demands and ended their strike.
78
 
This strike caused no gain in the NFLPA’s bargaining position, and serves as another 
example demonstrating how the owners impose their will on the athletes without giving 
much, if anything, in concession.
79
 
The most persuasive proof that the athletes are the weaker party arose from the 
1987 NFL strike.
80
 The players tried to assert their demands in a proposal to alter the free 
agency system and went on strike when the owners refused to concede to the player’s 
demand to remove hurdles that impeded free agency mobility amongst players.
81
 The 
owners foresaw a work stoppage and sought to procure insurance by contacting 
replacement players in case of a strike.
82
 When the strike occurred, the NFL owners 
continued the season with replacement players, but allowed any player on strike to cross 
the picket line and play whenever they wanted to be paid again.
83
 More than 200 players 
accepted the offer and crossed the picket line, severely hurting any chance the NFLPA 
had at forcing a deal to get the players back.
84
 Shortly after some players crossed the 
picket line, the remaining players agreed to end the strike and return to work, even 
though none of their demands were met by the owners.
85
 Time after time, the players 
have attempted to create a work stoppage, and, time after time, the owners have taken a 
hard stance by either making no concessions, or, in recent stoppages, making minimal 
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concessions to continue operations. Since the beginning, the players have been in a 
weaker position to bargain, and that has continued into today’s era of athletics. 
A rare example of athletes possessing the stronger position of bargaining power 
occurred in 2006 when a new NFL CBA, favorable to the players, was drafted to increase 
the amount of money available to players and grant the players a sixty percent split of the 
revenue generated by the league.
86
 This deal was meant to be in place for seven years, but 
the owners, once again, showed that they have the upper hand in negotiations and can 
effectively control the players at will. 
87
 A mere two years after agreeing to the player 
friendly conditions, the owners voted to opt out of the CBA at the earliest possible time.
88
 
Even if the players are able to acquire a CBA with fair terms, the owners have built in 
safety carve-outs that allow for them to cancel the terms of the agreement and create a 
new, more favorable deal, at the cost of the players.
89
  
The unity of owners versus the unity of the players further reflects the superior 
bargaining power of the owners. The owners of each league constitute a small number 
(thirty two in the NFL, and thirty in the NBA, NHL, and MLB). These thirty individuals 
can more easily act as a concerted force with similar desires and needs.
90
 Because of their 
small numbers, it is easy for the owners to come across as one unified entity.
91
 In 
comparison, there is a large number of disparate desires and needs when it comes to the 
athletes.
92
 Each league contains thousands of athletes, in addition to the thousands of 
athletes that will be in the league over the course of the upcoming years governed by the 
CBA being bargained for. Because of the large number of athletes and the numerous 
competing interests, it is almost impossible to hold a unified approach to negotiations.
93
 
These competing interests hinder the ability to negotiate and place the players in a weaker 
bargaining position in every negotiation, normally leading to the players taking more 
extreme measures in an attempt to achieve some of their requests.
94
 American athletes in 
the four major American athletic leagues are comparable to consumers and other 
employees in the context of labor agreements. Athletes, just like employees, can either 
accept the contract offered to them or watch as alternative employees are hired. Because 
there is little the employee can do to negotiate their employment contract, they operate on 
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a take-it-or-leave-it basis. When the players association negotiates with the owners, 
athletes are afforded opportunities to negotiate some of the major terms of their contracts; 
however, all of their demands will not be granted because the owners still have the 
opportunity to lock out the players or find replacements.  
IV. HOW TO SOLVE THE DISPARATE BARGAINING POWER IN AMERICAN ATHLETICS 
The rise of lockouts and work stoppages in the American major athletic leagues 
has given great concern to the owners, athletes, sponsors, television companies, and fans 
alike. There is a growing concern that the owners and athletes could continue to argue 
with one another at increasing rates, causing seasons for each league to be lost over failed 
negotiations. The protection that European consumer and labor law has given to weaker 
parties in arbitration should be replicated and included in all future CBAs in America’s 
four major sporting leagues to properly protect athletes’ interests. 
As described above, a large number of European countries afford the weaker 
bargaining party (consumers and employees) the protection of choosing not to arbitrate a 
claim, even if there is an arbitration agreement in the governing contract.
95
 This 
protection affords the weaker party the final say if they want to proceed with their claim 
in a forum other than the court after learning the facts of their dispute.
96
 While arbitration 
affords some significant benefits that the court system does not, such as speed, efficiency, 
informality, and customized proceedings there can be a significant loss of rights, when 
the choice to arbitrate is imposed by the stronger party upon the weaker party without a 
choice.
97
 Ultimately, the European justice system has afforded weaker parties the choice 
to arbitrate, to protect their rights from the stronger party imposing their will on the 
weaker party.
98
 The weaker party in the four major athletic leagues (athletes) should be 
afforded the same protection from the stronger party (owners) by preventing lock outs. 
The players would substantially benefit if they were to demand a clause in the next CBA 
that allowed for them to choose mandatory, binding arbitration upon the expiration of the 
CBA if a new deal does not exist. In addition to keeping the players on the “field,” it is 
mutually advantageous to allow a neutral arbitrator(s) to develop terms of a new CBA, 
which would prevent a lockout of the sports league until the parties reconvene to further 
negotiate. The arbitration clause the players should impose could be modeled after 
European employment arbitration, which suggests that during the construction of the new 
CBA terms the athletes should not strike and the owners should not lock out the players. 




                                                 
95
 See generally Sternlight, supra note 40; see also Rutledge and Howard, supra note 52.  
96
 See Tarasewicz, supra note 64, at 364. 
97
 See id. at 362. 
98
 See generally Sternlight, supra note 40; see also Rutledge and Howard, supra note 52.  
99
 See May Olivia Silverstein, Introduction to International Mediation and Arbitration: Resolving Labor 




This proposal should be a player-initiated addition to the next CBA. The 
proposition would require that at the expiration of the CBA, if a new CBA was not 
agreed to through negotiations between the owners and the players, mandatory arbitration 
would start to create the terms of a new CBA effective immediately. Each side to the 
arbitration would select an arbitrator, and those two arbitrators would select a third to act 
as the lead arbitrator, who would ensure the creation of a CBA with fair terms for both 
the owners and the players if the other two arbitrators could not reach an agreement. If, at 
any time prior to the expiration of the prior CBA, the parties agree to an extension to the 
current CBA or develop a new CBA, arbitration would be postponed until the next 
expiration date. Additionally, it should be suggested that both parties continue to operate 
as usual while the new CBA is being drafted by the arbitrators. This will remedy one of 
the major issues caused by a failure to negotiate in a timely matter - lock outs and strikes. 
The mandatory arbitration clause should become a fundamental part of the CBA, and 
should not be revoked any time after enactment.  
The mandatory arbitration proposal would carry multiple long term benefits for 
the weaker negotiation party (i.e., the athletes). First, the players would be given a right 
that finally places them on a level bargaining field with the owners. As delineated 
throughout this article, the owners of each league has had an upper hand in bargaining for 
CBA terms throughout history. Beyond negotiations, players have no real power, aside 
from striking, which only places minimal pressure on the owners.
100
 The options are 
limited, and only a few players are able to move on to other leagues in the world.
101
 As 
stated before, the players do not remain a unified front when they strike or face a lock 
out, and eventually the players have to concede some of their demands to reach a new 
CBA and resume their employment.
102
 Allowing the players to force arbitration and 
develop a binding CBA would allow the athletes to remain unified in negotiations before 
the expiration of the old CBA, and if their demands are not met to a satisfactory level, 
arbitration will commence to hopefully create an equitable deal for both sides. Similar to 
European consumer and labor arbitration rules, athletes could avoid arbitration by 
agreeing to an offer presented by the owners, or reject the offer and allow arbitration to 
take place.
 103
 While the European courts are concerned with the removal of consumer 
and employee rights by forcing arbitration, with the imposition of mandatory arbitration 
for CBAs, the courts would be taking an active role in protecting the employees’ (athletes 
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and referees) rights by allowing for arbitration if, during the negotiation of a new CBA, 
the terms were inherently unfair.
104
 
The second benefit that would arise from enacting a player’s ability to force 
arbitration is the creation of truly fair CBA terms. When the players are given the right to 
force arbitration, the owners must negotiate in good faith and present fair terms, 
otherwise the ability to make the terms of the CBA will be taken out of the owners’ hands 
and given to the arbitrators. A group of three neutral arbitrators will likely be able to 
generate terms that are fair for both sides and make CBA agreements void of owner 
favorable terms. Furthermore, the arbitrators will likely impose neutral terms that are not 
overly favorable to either side. Similarly, the players and owners will be more likely to 
negotiate in better faith, absent the inherent disparity in bargaining power. This process 
may make the terms of the CBA more equal. The owners may even be more willing to 
grant small concessions to the players, and vice versa, in exchange for small returns. For 
example, if players are concerned with the amount of money placed in health and safety 
programs and the owners want to have control over a larger part of the revenue, the 
parties might be willing to make concessions to appease the other party since the 
arbitration process will not guarantee their demands are met. This is different from the 
current process because now each party attempts to hold out long enough until the other 
party is forced to concede, so the stronger party ultimately receives most, if not all, of 
their demands. With mandatory arbitration, if each side is fearful of putting their desires 
into the hands of the three arbitrator panel, they should be more willing to strike a deal 
before the expiration of the CBA. 
A third benefit of mandatory arbitration upon the expiration of a CBA is the 
continued operation of the sports league. As mentioned above, the NFL, NBA, MLB, and 
NHL are some of the most profitable professional sports leagues, and with each lockout 
that takes place, billions of dollars are lost.
105
 With this proposed arbitration clause there 
should no longer be extended periods of work stoppages, because once a CBA expires 
(assuming negotiations fail prior to the expiration), work will continue while the 
arbitration panel works to create a new CBA with fair terms, as the European labor courts 
prefer.
106
 Ultimately, this will ensure the players continue to receive their salaries, the 
period between CBAs will be shorter, and a new deal will be in place shortly, as opposed 
to the indefinite lockouts that have become frequent under the current system.
107
 Also, 
the owners can continue to generate revenue and operate as the new terms of the CBA are 
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 Lastly, the fans will be able to continue enjoying the sports that have 
become engrained in our culture, and the numerous individuals and organizations that 
rely on these leagues as sources of income can continue to make a profit. With this 
suggested provision, lockouts and work stoppages in American athletics could soon be a 
thing of the past.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the current negotiation practices in the American athletic leagues 
between owners and the athletes is one that is heavily controlled by the owners. The 
athletes have little bargaining power, and this has shown over the course of history. Even 
with the ability to stop work, athletics continue to take place, normally after the athletes 
give up on their demands. European countries have decided to protect the rights of the 
weaker bargaining party in both consumer and employment arbitration by giving the 
weaker bargaining power the ability to choose to decline an arbitration agreement in their 
contracts to maintain fairness and justice. The four major Players Associations should 
demand and ensure that their next CBA agreement includes mandatory arbitration 
between the owners and the athletes or referees if they cannot come to an agreement on 
an extension on their prior CBA. This right would ensure equitable terms in future CBAs, 
create future ease in negotiating CBA terms, and guarantee continuous operations of their 
leagues. Without some protection from the owners, athletes will continue to be 
disadvantaged without any chance of advancing their bargaining powers or their rights. 
The mandatory arbitration proposal allows for the players to be properly represented and 
place themselves on equal footing with the owners, something that has never taken place 
since the inception of each league. 
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